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Abstract
This essay endeavors to define the concept of indefinite extensibility
in the setting of category theory. I argue that the generative property of
indefinite extensibility in the category-theoretic setting is identifiable with
the Kripke functors of modal coalgebraic automata, where the automata
model Grothendieck Universes and the functors are further inter-definable
with the elementary embeddings of large cardinal axioms. The Kripke
functors definable in Grothendieck universes are argued to account for
the ontological expansion effected by the elementary embeddings in the
category of sets. By characterizing the modal profile of Ω-logical validity,
and thus the generic invariance of mathematical truth, modal coalgebraic
automata are further capable of capturing the notion of definiteness, in
order to yield a non-circular definition of indefinite extensibility.
1 Introduction
This essay endeavors to provide a characterization of the notion of definite-
ness, in order to provide a non-circular definition of the concept of indefinite
extensibility. The concept of indefinite extensibility is introduced by Dummett
(1963/1978), in the setting of a discussion of the philosophical significance of
Gödel’s (1931) first incompleteness theorem. Gödel’s theorem can be character-
ized as stating that – relative to a coding defined over the signature of first-order
arithmetic, a predicate expressing the property of provability, and a fixed point
construction which is non-trivial, such that the formula in which the above
predicate figures precludes interpretations such as ’0=1’ – the formula can be
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defined as not satisfying the provability predicate. Dummett’s concern is with
the conditions on our grasp of the concept of natural number, given that the
latter figures in a formula whose truth appears to be satisfied despite the un-
provability – and thus non-constructivist profile – thereof (186). His conclusion
is that the concept of natural number ’exhibits a particular variety of inherent
vagueness, namely indefinite extensibility’, where a ’concept is indefinitely ex-
tensible if, for any definite characterisation of it, there is a natural extension
of this characterisation, which yields a more inclusive concept; this extension
will be made according to some general principle for generating such extensions,
and, typically, the extended characterisation will be formulated by reference to
the previous, unextended, characterisation’ (195-196). Elaborating on the no-
tion of indefinite extensibility, Dummett (1996: 441) redefines the concept as
follows: an ’indefinitely extensible concept is one such that, if we can form a
definite conception of a totality all of whose members fall under the concept,
we can, by reference to that totality, characterize a larger totality all of whose
members fall under it’. Subsequent approaches to the notion have endeavored to
provide a more precise elucidation thereof, either by providing an explanation
of the property which generalizes to an array of examples in number theory
and set theory (cf. Wright and Shapiro, 2006), or by availing of modal notions
in order to capture the properties of definiteness and extendability which are
constitutive of the concept (cf. Fine, 2006; Linnebo, 2013; Uzquiano, 2015).
However, the foregoing modal characterizations of indefinite extensibility have
similarly been restricted to set-theoretic languages. Furthermore, the modal
notions that the approaches avail of are taken to belong to a proprietary type
which is irreducible to either the metaphysical or the logical interpretations of
the operator.
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The aim of this essay is to redress the foregoing, by providing a modal char-
acterization of indefinite extensibility in the setting of category theory, rather
than number or set theory. One virtue of the category-theoretic, modal defi-
nition of indefinite extensibility is that it provides for a robust account of the
epistemological foundations of modal-structuralist approaches to the ontology
of mathematics. A second aspect of the philosophical significance of the ex-
amination is that it can serve to redress the lacuna noted in the appeal to an
irreducible type of mathematical modality, which is argued (i) to be represen-
tational, (ii) still to bear on the ontological expansion of domains of sets, and
yet (iii) not to range over metaphysical possibilities. By contrast to the lat-
ter approach, the category-theoretic characterization of indefinite extensibility
is able to identify the functors of coalgebraic non-deterministic automata with
elementary embeddings and the modal properties of set-theoretic, Ω-logical con-
sequence.
In Section 2, I examine the extant approaches to explaining both the prop-
erty and the understanding-conditions on the concept of indefinite extensibility.
In Section 3, I outline the elements of the category theory of sets and define
Grothendieck Universes. In Section 4, I identify Grothendieck Universes with
modal coalgebraic automata, and define the notion of indefinite extensibility
in the category-theoretic setting. I argue that the category-theoretic defini-
tion of indefinite extensibility, via Grothendieck Universes as modal coalgebraic
automata, yields an explanation of the generative property of indefinite exten-
sibility, as well as of the notion of definiteness which figures in the definition. I
argue that the generative property of indefinite extensibility can be captured by
identifying Kripke functors of colagebras with elementary embeddings. I argue,
then, that the notion of definiteness can be captured by the role of Grothendieck
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Universes-as-modal coalgebraic automata in characterizing the modal profile of
Ω-logical consequence, where the latter accounts for the absoluteness of mathe-
matical truths throughout the set-theoretic multiverse. The category-theoretic
definition is shown to circumvent the issues faced by rival attempts to define
indefinite extensibility via extensional and intensional notions within the setting
of set theory. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 Indefinite Extensbility in Set Theory: Modal
and Extensional Approaches
Characterizations of indefinite extensibility have so far occurred in the language
of set theory, and have availed of both extensional and intensional resources. In
an attempt to define the notion of definiteness, Wright and Shapiro (op. cit.)
argue, for example, that indefinite extensibility may be intuitively characterized
as occurring when there is a function which falls under a first-order concept; for
a sub-concept of the first-order concept, an application of the function on the
sub-concept does not fall within that sub-concept’s range; however, a new sub-
concept can be formed, and defined as the set-theoretic union of the initial
sub-concept and the function applied thereon (266).
Formally, let Π be a higher-order concept of type τ . Let P be a first-order
concept falling under Π of type τ . Let f be a function from entities to entities
of the same type as P. Finally, let X be a sub-concept of P. P is indefinitely
extensible with respect to Π, if and only if:
ǫ(P) = f(X),
ǫ(X) = ¬[f(X)], and
∃X’[Π(X’) = (X∪{fX})] (op. cit.).
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The notion of definiteness is then defined as the limitless preservation of
’Π-hood’ by sub-concepts thereof ’under iteration of the relevant operation’, f
(269).
The foregoing impresses as a necessary condition on the property of indefi-
nite extensibility. Wright and Shapiro note, e.g., that the above formalization
generalizes to an array of concepts countenanced in first-order number theory
and analysis, including concepts of the finite ordinals (defined by iterations of
the successor function); of countable ordinals (defined by countable order-types
of well-orderings); of regular cardinals (defined as occurring when the cofinality
of a cardinal, κ – comprised of the unions of sets with cardinality less than κ
– is identical to κ); of large cardinals (defined by elementary embeddings from
the universe of sets into proper subsets thereof, which specify critical points
measured by the ordinals); of real numbers (defined as cuts of sets of rational
numbers); and of Gödel numbers (defined as natural numbers of a sequence of
recursively enumerable truths of arithmetic) (266-267).
As it stands, however, the definition might not be sufficient for the defi-
nition of indefinite extensibility, by being laconic about the reasons for which
new sub-concepts – comprised as the union of preceding sub-concepts with a
target operation defined thereon – are presumed interminably to generate. In
response to the above desideratum, concerning the reasons for which indefi-
nite extensibility might be engendered, philosophers have recently appealed to
modal properties of the formation of sets. Fine (2006) argues, e.g., that – in
order to avoid the Russell property when quantifying over all sets – there are in-
terpretational modalities which induce a reinterpretation of quantifier domains,
and serve as a mechanism for tracking the ontological inflation of the hiearar-
chy of sets via, e.g., the power-set operation (2007). Fine (2005) suggests that
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the interpretational modality at issue might be a species of dynamic modality,
which defines modalities as concerning the information entrained by program
executions. Reinhardt (1974) and Williamson (2007) argue that modalities are
inter-definable with counterfactuals. While Williamson (2016) argues both that
imaginative exercises take the form of counterfactual presuppositions and that it
is metaphysically possible to decide propositions which are undecidable relative
to the current axioms of extensional mathematical languages such as ZF – Rein-
hardt (op. cit.) argues that large cardinal axioms and undecidable sentences
in extensional ZF can similarly be imagined as obtaining via counterfactual
presupposition. In an examination of the iterative hierarchy of sets, Parsons
(1977/1983) notes that the notion of potential infinity, as anticipated in Book
3, ch. 6 of Aristotle’s Physics, may be codified in a modal set theory by both
a principle which is an instance of the Barcan formula (namely, for predicates
P and rigidifying predicates Q, ∀x(Px ⇐⇒ Qx) ∧ {∀x(Qx ∨ ¬Qx) ∧
∀R[∀x(Qx→ Rx)→ ∀x(Qx→ Rx)]} (fn. 24), as well as a principle for defin-
able set-forming operations (e.g., unions) for Borel sets of reals (∀x)⋄(∃y)[y=x
∪ {x}) (528). The modal extension is argued to be a property of the imagina-
tion, or intuition, and to apply further to iterations of the successor function in
an intensional variant of arithmetic (1979-1980).
Hellman (1990) develops the program intimated in Putnam (1967), and thus
argues for an eliminativist, modal approach to mathematical structuralism as
applied to second-order plural ZF. The possibilities at issue are taken to be
logical – concerning both the consistency of a set of formulas as well as the
possible satisfiaction of existential formulas – and he specifies, further, an ’ex-
tendability principle’, according to which ’every natural model [of ZF] has a
proper extension’ (421).
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Extending Parsons’ and Fine’s projects, Linnebo (2009, 2013) avails of a
second-order, plural modal set theory in order to account for both the notion of
potential infinity as well as the notion of definiteness. Similarly to Parsons’ use
of the Barcan formula (i.e., ∀φ→ ∀φ), Linnebo’s principle for the foregoing is
as follows: ∀u(u ≺ xx→ φ)→ ∀u(u ≺ → φ) (2013: 211). He argues, further,
that the logic for the modal operator is S4.2, i.e. K [(φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ)],
T (φ → φ), 4 ((φ → φ), and G (⋄φ → ⋄φ). Studd (2013) examines
the notion of indefinite extensibility by availing of a bimodal temporal logic.
Uzquiano’s (2015) approach to defining the concept of indefinite extensibility
argues that the height of the cumulative hierarchy is in fact fixed, and that
indefinite extensibility can similarly be captured via the use of modal operators
in second-order plural modal set theory. The modalities are taken to concern
the possible reinterpretations of the intensions of the non-logical vocabulary –
e.g., the set-membership relation – which figures in the augmentation of the
theory with new axioms and the subsequent climb up the fixed hierarchy of sets
(cf. Gödel, 1947/1964).
Khudairi (ms1) proffers a novel epistemology of mathematics, based on an
application of the epistemic interpretation of multi-dimensional intensional se-
mantics in set-theoretic languages to the values of large cardinal axioms and un-
decidable sentences. Modulo logical constraints such as consistency and generic
absoluteness in the extensions of ground models of the set-theoretic multiverse,
the epistemic possibility that an undecidable proposition receives a value may
serve, then, as a guide to the metaphysical possibility thereof. Finally, Khudairi
(ms2) argues that the modal profile of the consequence relation, in the Ω-logic
defined in Boolean-valued models of set-theory, can be captured by coalgebraic
modal automata, and provides a necessary condition on the formal grasp of the
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concept of ’set’.
The foregoing accounts of the metaphysics and epistemology of indefinite
extensibility are each defined in the languages of number and set theory. In the
following section, I examine the nature of indefinite extensibility in the setting
of category theory, instead. One aspect of the philosophical significance of the
examination is that it can serve to provide an analysis of the mathematical
modality at issue, by availing only of model-theoretic resources. By contrast
to Hellman’s approach, which takes the mathematical modality at issue to be
logical (cf. Field, 1989: 37; Rayo, 2013), and Fine’s (op. cit.) approach, which
takes the mathematical modality to be dynamic, I argue in the following sections
that the mathematical modality can be captured by the functors of coalgebraic
modal automata, where the latter are identifiable with Grothendieck Universes.
3 Grothendieck Universes
We work within a two-sorted language in which the Eilenberg - Mac Lane Ax-
ioms of category theory are specified. Types are labeled A,B,C for objects and
x,y,z for arrows. The relevant operators are the domain operator, Dom, which
takes arrows to objects; the codomain operator, Cod, which operates similarly,
and the identity operator, 1α, which takes objects to arrows. Finally, a com-
position relation, C(x,y; z), is defined on arrows, where the open formula reads
z is the composite of x and y (McLarty, 2008: 13). The Eilenberg - Mac Lane
axioms can then be defined as follows:
• Axioms of Domain and Codomain:
∀f,g,h, if C(f,g,h), then Domf = Domh and Codf = Domg and Codg = Codh
• Axioms of Existence and Uniqueness of Composites:
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∀f,g, if Codf = Domg, then ∃!h, s.t. C(f,g; h)
• Axioms for Identity Arrows:
∀A, Dom1A = Cod1A = A
∀f, C(1(Domf),f; f)
∀f, C(f,1(Domf); f)
• Axiom of Associativity of Composition:
∀f,g,h,i,j,k, if C(f,g; i) and C(g,h; j) and C(f,j; k), then C(i,h; k) (op. cit.).
Categorical Set Theory is defined by augmenting the Eilenberg - Mac Lane
axioms with the axioms of Lawvere’s Elementary Theory for the Category of Sets
(ECTS) (op. cit.; Lawvere, 2005). Following McLarty, we define the singleton
of a set as one for which ’every set has exactly one function to it’ (op. cit.: 25).
An element of a set A, x∈A, is a function x: 1 → A (op. cit.). Composition
occurs if and only if, for two arrows, f,g, and object x, (gf)(x) = g(f(x)) (26).
Finally, an equalizer e: E→ A for a pair of functions f,g: A→ B is defined as ’a
universal solution to the equaltion fe = ge’ (29). The axioms are then defined
as follows (op. cit.):
• Every pair of sets, A,B, has a product:
∀T,f,g, with f: T → A, g: T → B, ∃!〈f,g〉: T → AxB
• Every parallel pair of functions, f,g: A → B, has an equalizer:
∀T,h, with fh = gh, ∃! u: T → E
• There is a function set from each set A to each set B:
∀C and g: CxA → B, ∃!g’: C → BA
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• There is a truth value true: 1 → 2:
∀A and monic S 7→A, ∃!χi, such that S is an equalizer
• There is a natural number triple, N, 0, s:
∀T and x: 1 → T and f: T → T, ∃! u: ⋉ → T
• Extensionality
∀f 6= g: A → B, ∃x: 1 → A, with f(x) 6= g(x)
• Non-triviality
∃false: 1 → 2, s.t. false 6= true
• Choice
∀ onto functions f: A → B, ∃h: B → A, s.t. fh = 1A.
From the axioms of ETCS, only a version of the ZF separation axiom with
bounded quantifiers can be recovered (37). The axiom of separation states that
∃x∀u[u∈x ⇐⇒ u∈a ∧ φ(u)]. In order to redress the restriction to bounded
quantifiers, we work within a stronger category theory for sets, i.e. the ’category
of categories as foundation’ (CCAF). The axioms of the CCAF build upon those
of both ETCS and Eilenberg - Mac Lane category theory, by augmenting them
with the following (53):
• Every category C has a unique functor, C → 1
• The category 2 has exactly two functors from 1 and 3 to itself
• Let a pushout be defined such that if f: A → C and g: B → C, then a:
C → A and b: C → B (Pettigrew, ms: 19). The category 3 is a pushout,
and there is a functor γ: 2 → 3, with γ0 = α0 and γ1 = β1
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• Arrow Extensionality
∀F,G: A → B, if F 6= G then ∃f: 2 → A with Ff 6= Gf.
A Grothendieck Universe may finally be defined as a set, U, which satisfies
the axioms of ZF set theory without choice, yet as augmented by at least strongly
inaccessible large cardinals. The axioms of ZF are:
• Empty set:
∃x∀u(u/∈x)
• Extensionality:
x = y ⇐⇒ ∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u∈y)
• Pairing:
∃x∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u = a ∨ u = b)
• Union:
∃x∀u[u∈x ⇐⇒ ∃v(u∈v ∧ v∈a)]
• Separation:
∃x∀u[u∈x ⇐⇒ u∈a ∧ φ(u)]
• Power Set:
∃x∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u⊆a)
• Infinity:
∃x∅∈x ∧ ∀u(u∈x → {u}∈x)
• Replacement:
∀u∃!vψ(u,v) → ∀x∃y(∀u∈x)(∃v∈y)ψ(u,v).
11
Large cardinal axioms are defined by elementary embeddings.1 Elementary
embeddings can be defined thus. For models A,B, and conditions φ, j: A →
B, φ〈a1, . . . , an〉 in A if and only if φ〈j(a1), . . . , j(an)〉 in B (Kanamori, 2012:
363). A cardinal κ is regular if the cofinality of κ – comprised of the unions of
sets with cardinality less than κ – is identical to κ (op. cit.: 360). Uncountable
regular limit cardinals are weakly inaccessible (op. cit.). A strongly inaccessible
cardinal is regular and has a strong limit, such that if λ < κ, then 2λ < κ (op.
cit.).
By augmenting languages of the theory of CCAF with Grothendiek Uni-
verses, U, CCAF proves thereby that:
CCAF ⊢ ∀n∈N, ∃{ℵ0, ℵ1, . . . , ℵn}, in the category of Sets, U-Set (37-38).
4 Modal Coalgebraic Automata and Indefinite
Extensibility
This section examines, finally, the reasons for which Grothendieck Universes pro-
vide a more theoretically adequate model of the understanding-conditions for
mathematical concepts than do competing approaches such as the Neo-Fregean
epistemology of mathematics. According, e.g., to the Neo-Fregean program, con-
cepts of number in arithmetic and analysis are definable via implicit definitions
which take the form of abstraction principles. Abstraction principles specify bi-
conditionals in which – on the left-hand side of the formula – an identity is taken
to hold between numerical term-forming operators from second-order entities to
abstract objects, and – on the right-hand side of the formula – an equivalence
relation on lower-order entities is assumed to hold.
1Cf. Koellner and Woodin (2010); Woodin (2010).
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In the case of cardinal numbers, the relevant abstraction principle is referred
to as Hume’s principle, and states that, for all x and y, the number of the x’s
is identical to the number of the y’s if and only if the x’s and the y’s can be
put into a one-to-one correspondence, i.e., there is a bijection from the x’s onto
the y’s. Abstraction principles for the concepts of other numbers have further
been specified. Thus, e.g., Shapiro (2000: 337-340) specifies an abstraction
principle for real numbers, which proceeds along the method of Dedekind’s
definition of the reals (cf. Wright, 2007: 172). According to the latter method,
one proceeds by specifying an abstraction principle which avails of the natural
numbers, in order to define pairs of finite cardinals: ’∀x,y,z,w[〈x,y〉 = 〈z,w〉
⇐⇒ x = z ∧ y = w]. A second abstraction principle is defined which takes the
differences of the foregoing pairs of cardinals, identifying the differences with
integers: [Diff(〈x,y〉) = Diff(〈z,w〉) ⇐⇒ x + w = y + z]. One specifies, then,
a principle for quotients of the integers, identifying them subsequently with the
rational numbers: [Q〈m,n〉 = Q〈p,q〉 ⇐⇒ n = 0 ∧ q = 0 ∨ n 6= 0 ∧ q 6= 0 ∧ m
x q = n x p]. Finally, one specifies sets of rational numbers, i.e. the Dedekind
cuts thereof, and identifies them with the reals: ∀F,G[Cut(F) = Cut(G) ⇐⇒
∀r(F≤r ⇐⇒ G≤r)].
The abstractionist program faces several challenges, including whether con-
ditions can be delineated for the abstraction principles, in order for the princi-
ples to avoid entraining inconsistency2; whether unions of abstraction principles
can avoid the problem of generating more abstracts than concepts (Fine, 2002);
and whether abstraction principles can be specified for mathematical entities in
branches of mathematics beyond first and second-order arithmetic (cf. Boolos,
1997; Hale, 2000; Shapiro, op. cit.; and Wright, 2000). I will argue that the last
2Cf. Hodes (1984); Hazen (1985); Boolos (1990); Heck (1992); Fine (2002); Weir (2003);
Cook and Ebert (2005); Linnebo and Uzquiano (2009); Linnebo (2010); and Walsh (2016).
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issue – i.e., being able to countenance definitions for the entities and structures
in branches of mathematics beyond first and second-order arithmetic – is a cru-
cial desideratum, the satisfaction of which remains elusive for the Neo-Fregean
program while yet being satisfiable and thus adducing in favor of the modal
platonist approach that is outlined in what follows.
One issue for the attempt, along abstractionist lines, to provide an implicit
definition for the concept of set is that doing so with an unrestricted comprehen-
sion principle yields a principle identical to Frege’s (1893/2013) Basic Law V;
and thus – in virtue of Russell’s paradox – entrains inconsistency. However, two
alternative formulas can be defined, in order to provide a suitable restriction
to the inconsistent abstraction principle. The first, conditional principle states
that ∀F,G[[Good(F) ∨ Good(G)] → [{x|Fx} = {Gx} ⇐⇒ ∀x(Fx ⇐⇒ Gx)]].
The second principle is an unconditional version of the foregoing, and states
that ∀F,G[{x|Fx} = {Gx} ⇐⇒ [Good(F) ∨ Good(G) → ∀x(Fx ⇐⇒ Gx)]].
Following von Neumann’s (1925/1967: 401-402) suggestion that Russell’s para-
dox can be avoided with a restriction of the set comprehension principle to one
which satisfies a constraint on the limitation of its size, Boolos (1997) suggests
that the ’Good’ predicate in the above principles is intensionally isomorphic
to the notion of smallness in set size, and refers to the principle as New V.
However, New V is insufficient for deriving all of the axioms of ZF set theory,
precluding, in particular, both the axioms of infinity and the power-set axiom
(cf. Wright and Hale, 2005: 193). Further, there are other branches of number
theory for which it is unclear whether acceptable abstraction principles can be
specified. Wiles’ proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem (i.e., that, save for when one
of the variables is 0, the Diophantine equation, xn = yn = zn, has no solutions
when n >2; cf. Hardy and Wright, 1979: 190) relies, e.g., on both invariants and
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Grothendieck universes in cohomological number theory (cf. McLarty, 2009: 4).
The foregoing issues with regard to the definability of abstracta in number
theory, algebraic geometry (McLarty, op. cit.: 6-8), set theory, et al., can be cir-
cumvented in the category-theoretic setting; and in particular by colagebras. In
the remainder of this section, I endeavor to demonstrate how modal coalgebraic
automata are able to countenance two, fundamental mathematical concepts.
The first is the target concept in this essay, namely indefinite extensibility. The
second concerns the epistemic and modal properties of the concept of logical
consequence, in the Ω-logic in axiomatic set theory.
A labeled transition system is a tuple, LTS, comprised of a set of worlds,
M; a valuation, V, from M to its powerset, P(M); and a family of accessibility
relations, R. So LTS = 〈M,V,R〉 (cf. Venema, 2012: 7). A Kripke coalgebra
combines V and R into a Kripke functor, σR; i.e. the set of binary morphisms
from M to P(M) (op. cit.: 7-8). Thus, for an s∈M, σ(s) := [σV (s), σR(s)] (op.
cit.). Satisfaction for the system is defined inductively as follows: For a formula
φ defined at a state, s, in M,
JφKM = V(s) 3
J¬φKM = S – V(s)
J⊥KM = ∅
JTKM = M
Jφ ∨ ψKM = JφKM ∪ JψKM
Jφ ∧ ψKM = JφKM ∩ JψKM
J⋄sφKM = 〈Rs〉JφKM
JsφK
M = [Rs]JφK
M , with
〈Rs〉(φ) := {s’∈S | Rs[s’] ∩ φ 6= ∅} and
3Equivalently, M,s  φ if s∈V(φ) (9).
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[Rs](φ) := {s’∈S | Rs[s’] ⊆ φ} (9).
Kripke Coalgebras can be identified with Grothendieck Universes. In CCAF,
the elementary embeddings which are jointly necessary and sufficient for posit-
ing the existence of large cardinals can further be identified with the functors,
i.e. transition functions, in modal coalgebraic automata. Finally, Kripke coal-
gebras are the dual representations of Boolean-valued models of the Ω-logic of
set theory (cf. Venema, 2007). When identified with Grothendieck Universes,
modal coalgebraic automata are able, then, to countenance the consitutive con-
ditions of indefinite extensibility. Modal coalgebraic automata are capable, e.g.,
of defining both the generative property of indefinite extensibility, as well as
the notion of definiteness which figures therein. Further, the category-theoretic
definition of indefinite extensibility is arguably preferable to those advanced in
the set-theoretic setting, because modal coalgebraic automata can account for
both the modal profile and the epistemic tractability of Ω-logical consequence.
The generative property of indefinite extensibility is captured by the forego-
ing Kripke functor, σR – i.e., the morphism mapping a Boolean-valued model
to the powerset thereof – and which we have identified with elementary em-
beddings, j: A → B, φ〈a1, . . . , an〉 in A if and only if φ〈j(a1), . . . , j(an)〉 in
B.
The notion of definiteness is captured by the role of modal coalgebraic au-
tomata in characterizing the modal profile of Ω-logical validity. Ω-logical validity
can be defined as follows:
For T∪{φ}⊆Sent,
T |=Ω φ, if for all ordinals a and countable Boolean algebras B, if VBa |= T,
then VBa |= φ (Bagaria et al., 2006). The Ω-Conjecture states that V |=Ω φ iff
VB |=Ω φ (Woodin, ms). Thus, Ω-logical validity is invariant in all set-forcing
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extensions of ground models in the set-theoretic multiverse.
The invariance property of Ω-logical consequence can then be characterized
by modal coalgebraic automata. Mathematical truths are thus said to be defi-
nite in virtue of holding of necessity, as recorded by the functors of the modal
colagebraic automata which are dually isomorphic to the Boolean-valued alge-
braic models for the Ω-logic of set theory.
Thus, whereas the Neo-Fregean approach to comprehension for the concept
of set relies on an unprincipled restriction of the size of the universe in order to
avoid inconsistency, and one according to which the axioms of ZF still cannot all
be recovered, modal coalgebraic automata provide a natural means for defining
the minimal conditions necessary for formal grasp of the concept set. The
category-theoretic definition of indefinite extensibility is sufficient for uniquely
capturing both the generative property as well as the notion of definiteness
which are constitutive of the concept. Finally, a further point adducing in favor
of the category-theoretic definition of indefinite extensibility is that it requires no
appeal to a notion of mathematical modality which problematically endeavors
to capture both the epistemic property of possible interpretations of quantifiers,
as well as the metaphysical property of set-theoretic ontological expansion.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this essay, I outlined a number of approaches to defining the notion of indef-
inite extensibility, each of which restricts the scope of their characterization to
set-theoretic languages. I endeavored, then, to define indefinite extensibility in
the setting of category-theoretic languages, and examined the benefits accruing
to the approach, by contrast to the extensional and modal approaches pursued
in ZF.
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The extensional definition of indefinite extensibility in ZF was shown to be
insufficient for characterizing the generative property in virtue of which number-
theoretic concepts are indefinitely extensible. The generative property of indef-
inite extensibility in the category-theoretic setting was argued, by contrast, to
be identifiable with the Kripke functors of modal coalgebraic automata, where
the automata model Grothendieck Universes, and Kripke functors are further
identifiable with the elementary embeddings by which large cardinal axioms can
be specified. The modal definitions of indefinite extensibility in ZF were argued
to be independently problematic, in virtue of endeavoring simultaneously to
account for the epistemic properties of indefinite extensibility – e.g., possible
reinterpretations of quantifier domains and mathematical vocabulary – as well
as the metaphysical properties of indefinite extensibility – i.e., the ontological
expansion of the target domains. By contrast, the Kripke functors definable
in Grothendieck universes-as-modal coalgebraic automata were argued to cir-
cumvent the foregoing conflation, accounting just for the ontological expansion
effected by elementary embeddings in the category of sets.
Finally, against the Neo-Fregean approach to defining concepts of number,
and the limits thereof in the attempt to define concepts of mathematical ob-
jects in other branches of mathematics beyond arithmetic, I demonstrated how
– by characterizing the modal profile of Ω-logical validity and thus the generic
invariance and absoluteness of mathematical truths concerning large cardinals
throughout the set-theoretic multiverse – modal coalgebraic automata are ca-
pable of capturing the notion of definiteness within the concept of indefinite
extensibility.
18
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